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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-
AN ELEVATED JUDICIARY
The Honorable Robert L. Eisen*
David K. Smrtnik**
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 accomplishes a complete revi-
sion of bankruptcy practice. Included in this revision is the crea-
tion of a new, functionally independent United States Bankruptcy
Court to administer the provisions of the Act. Judge Eisen and Mr.
Smrtnik examine the new court's functions and explore the effect of
the bankruptcy court's new elevated status on federal bankruptcy
law.
One of the most important changes introduced by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 19781 concerns the role of the bankruptcy court. Formerly, the bank-
ruptcy court had been relegated to a dependent position, enjoying neither
the autonomy nor the prestige necessary to adjudicate bankruptcy matters
effectively. The Reform Act, however, establishes the bankruptcy court as an
"adjunct to the district court" 2 boasting an independent judiciary, 3 expansive
jurisdiction, 4 and a separation of judicial and administrative functions. 5
These alterations reform and invigorate federal bankruptcy procedure.
In practice, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 6 had been rendered obsolete by
social, legal, and economic permutation. 7  This, in turn, created public re-
lations problems. Those who were unaware of the bankruptcy policies in-
volved viewed bankruptcy proceedings with suspicion because decisions ap-
peared to be based on strained readings of the statute 8 and mysterious
*United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
A.B., J.D., Loyola University of Chicago.
**Former Extern with the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., DePaul University.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in 11 U.S.C. app. (Supp. 11 1978) & scat-
tered sections of 2, 7, 12, 15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 46, 48, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. II
1978)).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 11 1978).
3. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. II 1978).
5. See notes 70-120 and accompanying text infra.
6. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-99) as amended by Chandler Act,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (1976)) (repealed 1979).
7. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. See also Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 101 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cyr].
8. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966) (a business' loss-carryback tax
refund is "property" passing to the trustee's control under § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act); In re
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court-created rules. 9 This suspicion was exacerbated by the presence of
bankruptcy specialists who, because of their familiarity with bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, anticipated and utilized apparently baseless court logic to their
client's advantage. 10
Although there had been several congressional attempts to cure the defi-
ciencies of the Bankruptcy Act," the problems did not abate. Therefore,
faced with an outmoded and constitutionally questionable bankruptcy sys-
tem,1 2 Congress considered several alternatives to the existing Act. At one
extreme was the possibility of placing federal bankruptcy in the control of a
new administrative agency while using bankruptcy courts in a very limited
administrative review capacity. 13 A middle ground possibility was for the
existing bankruptcy courts-subservient to the district courts and already
required to perform substantial administrative duties-to assume the addi-
tional task of administering the substantive provisions of the Reform Act. l4
At the other extreme, a separate and independent court could be estab-
lished. The fact that Congress chose this final alternative indicates the cru-
cial role that bankruptcy courts are expected to play in the success of the
Reform Act.
This Article focuses on the specific provisions of the Reform Act establish-
Thomas Groso Inv., Inc., 457 F.2d 168, 171 (9th Cir. 1972) (a right to redeem real property
sold at a foreclosure sale is property subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under
chapter X).
9. E.g., SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 401 (automatic stay on the filing of a petition); id. R. 608
(abandonment of property); id. R. 913 (writ of habeas corpus).
The Reform Act continues to apply the old bankruptcy rules "to the extent not inconsistent"
with the Reform Act and until they are either repealed or superseded by new rules. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2687. The Supreme Court may also
issue additional rules necessary for a smooth transition to the new court system. Id. § 410.
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference has undertaken a
complete revision of the bankruptcy rules in light of the Reform Act. It is anticipated that it will
be two years before these rules are submitted to Congress and the Supreme Court. However,
on August 15, 1979, the committee issued suggested interim bankruptcy rules to be effective in
those districts that order their adoption as local rules. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANK-
RUPTCY RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUGGESTED INTERIM
BANKRUPTCY RULES (1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM RULES].
10. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 95.
11. See, e.g., Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (revising generally); Act of June 28,
1946, ch. 512, 60 Stat. 323; Act of Dec. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (1970-71).
12. The previous bankruptcy system had been constitutionally questionable in that courts
had been legislating alterations in substantive law by means of "procedural rules," thus pre-
cipitating separation of power issues. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, I1; Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); Burnside Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc.,
392 F.2d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1968).
13. This was suggested by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R..Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part I, 103 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMIS-
SION REPORT]. The Commission was established by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970-71), for the purpose of studying and recommending changes in the
bankruptcy laws.
14. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
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ing the elevation of the bankruptcy courts. Specifically examined are those
provisions creating an independent judiciary, expanding the court's jurisdic-
tion, and providing for a delineation of judicial and administrative functions.
JUDICIAL AUTONOMY
Under the previous system, the bankruptcy court had nearly achieved
"de facto" independence. 15 Theoretically, district courts had been
responsible for the supervision of bankruptcy courts through their powers to
appoint and remove bankruptcy judges, 16 review bankruptcy court decisions
on appeal, 17 and strictly control the contempt"8 and injunctive powers of
bankruptcy courts.19  Despite their theoretical control, however, the district
courts effectively were removing themselves from the bankruptcy arena.
The district courts' surrender of control was the result of two factors.
First, the high degree of specialization required for bankruptcy law caused
district judges to feel uncomfortable when dealing with bankruptcy mat-
ters. 20 Second, there was an explosive increase in the number of bank-
ruptcy proceedings, which added to the already overcrowded dockets exist-
ing in the district courts. 2' Thus, it was natural for district court judges to
concentrate on matters other than bankruptcy. As a result, the district courts
allowed and encouraged the bankruptcy courts' evolution toward indepen-
dence. 22
In light of the previous bankruptcy court system of self-developed but
effective independence, Congress chose, through the Reform Act, to enlarge
15. Id. at 9.
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 555 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 34. 52 Stat. 857 (1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1976)) (repealed
1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 801-14.
17. Id. § 39, as amended by Chandler Act § 39(c), 52 Stat. at 858 (11 U.S.C. § 67(c)).
18. Id. § 2 (15), 30 Stat. at 545, 52 Stat. at 843 (11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15)); Sup. CT. R. BANKR.
P. 765.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 2(16), 41, 30 Stat. 545, 556 (1897-99), as amended
by Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 2(a)(16), 41, 52 Stat. 843, 859 (1938) (formerly codified in 11
U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(16), 69 (1976)) (repealed 1979); SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 920.
20. For example, one of the most difficult determinations a court hearing a bankruptcy case
must make involves judging when federal bankruptcy law displaces general state law. District
courts, lacking the benefit of a routine familiarity with bankruptcy procedures, moved hesi-
tantly when faced with this decision. Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases,
47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 407-76, 631-73 (1972).
21. At the time of the enactment of the Reform Act, there were approximately 250,000
bankruptcy cases pending. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7,
at 4.
22. In addition to this conduct by the district courts, action by both Congress and the
Supreme Court contributed to the relative independence of bankruptcy courts under the old
Act. In 1946, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to extend the terms of bankruptcy
referees-as bankruptcy judges were then called-from two to six years. Act of June 28, 1946,
ch. 512, § 2, 60 Stat. 323, 324. The security provided by this change in tenure allowed bank-
ruptcy judges to remain more independent. In addition, the 1973 version of the Supreme Court
1979] 1009
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the degree of court autonomy. 23 The Senate and the House of Representa-
tives differed, however, on the degree of independence that should be
granted. The House wanted the new bankruptcy courts to be completely
independent. 24 The Senate also wanted independence for the new courts,
but only as "adjuncts to the United States district courts." 25  The enacted
compromise retained the Senate's structure and established the bankruptcy
courts as district court adjuncts. Yet, the Reform Act also preserved the
nearly total functional separation between bankruptcy courts and district
courts that had existed under the old Act. Indeed, the only operational in-
teraction remaining between the two courts occurs in the narrow areas of
contempt and injunctive certification 2 6 and perhaps appellate review. 27
Indicia of the bankruptcy court's new position of elevated autonomy are
prevalent throughout the Reform Act. The Act provides both procedural and
substantive innovations that secure the independence of the bankruptcy sys-
tem while retaining the protections inherent in an adjunctive relationship
with the federal district courts. A number of these innovations characterize
the Reform Act as a congressional sanction of the bankruptcy judiciary's in-
dependence.
One significant procedural change, which serves to elevate the bank-
ruptcy court's power, autonomy, and prestige, establishes the new system of
appellate review. Under the previous system, all appeals from final orders
went directly to the federal district court.28 Indeed, the district court had
become an appellate tribunal under the 1973 Supreme Court Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure. 29 The previous procedural system was seriously deficient
in that it necessitated an additional, expensive step for bankruptcy litigants
before an appeal could be made to the court of appeals. In addition, by
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure solidified the bankruptcy court's move toward independence and
autonomy by adopting three specific changes. First, the title of the office was changed from
"referee of the court of bankruptcy" to the more prestigious "bankruptcy judge." Sup. CT. R.
BANKn. P. 901(7). Second, consensual jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was expanded, mak-
ing the bankruptcy court more of a favored forum. Id. R. 915(a). Third, the rules characterized
the role of bankruptcy judges as significantly more judicial in nature. See Advisory Committee's
Introductory Note to the Preliminary Draft, SuP. CT. R. BANIR. P. (1973 Collier pamphlet
ed.).
23. Autonomy was given in keeping with the "trend] of modern judicial administration."
HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
24. Id. at 7.
25. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-16.
26. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. II 1978 with Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 41,
30 Stat. 556 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 41, 52 Stat. 859 (1938) (formerly
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 69 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
27. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra.
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 39, 30 Stat. 555 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 39(c), 52 Stat. 858 (1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976)) (repealed
1979); Sup. Ct. R. Bankr. P. 801-03 (1973).
29. Sup. Ct. R. Bankr. P. 810 (1973).
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providing for appellate review by a single district court judge, the old sys-
tem undermined the credibility and authority of the bankruptcy court,
Moreover, the previous appellate procedure added an unnecessary decisional
burden on district courts already confronted with burgeoning dockets.
The Reform Act provides that if the parties agree, appeals from final or-
ders of the bankruptcy court will go directly to the appropriate circuit court
of appeals. 30 Only where the parties cannot agree will either an appellate
panel of three bankruptcy judges, 31 or a single district court judge, 32 review
a bankruptcy judge's order. 33 Therefore, the new system of appellate re-
view not only accomplishes elimination of the litigant's unnecessary financial
burden, but also provides both symbolic and actual procedural deference to
the bankruptcy judge consonant with the general substantive elevation of the
position. 34
Despite the importance of this change in appellate review, the most sig-
nificant indicators of the elevation of the bankruptcy courts are those Reform
Act provisions conferring greater substantive powers upon bankruptcy
judges. For example, the Reform Act enhances the independent functioning
of the bankruptcy courts by providing them with the necessary power to
conduct and control their own housekeeping responsibilities. Specifically,
bankruptcy courts are now empowered to employ a clerk of the bankruptcy
court whose sole responsibility is the processing of bankruptcy cases. 35  In
addition, bankruptcy judges also are allowed to employ their own docket
clerks, law clerks, and secretaries. 36 Furthermore, funds have beeen made
available to secure new libraries for the bankruptcy courts. 37
The provision for a "chief judge of the bankruptcy court" in all districts
having more than one judge 38 is a greater indication of the independence
bankruptcy courts have obtained through the Reform Act. The chief
judge-the senior bankruptcy judge of the district court under seventy years
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. 11 1978). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1482(b) (Supp. 11 1978)
provides that panels designated under 28 U.S.C. § 160(a) shall have jurisdiction over appeals
from interlocutory judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts. This jurisdiction,
however, is only extended by leave of the panel to which the appeal is taken.
31. Id. §§ 160(a), 1482.
32. Id. § 1334.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (Supp. 11 1978) provides that "[e]ach judicial council shall make all
necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts
within its circuit." Therefore, if the parties cannot agree as to the appropriate appellate tribunal,
the district judicial council should have the power to make such a decision.
34. The position of bankruptcy judge is elevated by the increase in substantive powers
granted the judiciary as well as the autonomy that the Reform Act both provides and protects.
Consonant with this is the obvious congressional intent to enhance the role of bankruptcy judge
with prestige. See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-16.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. II 1978).
36. Id. § 772.
37. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 175.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 155 (Supp. 11 1978).
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of age-will be responsible for observance of the rules and orders of the
court and for the division of business and assignment of cases.3 9 Under the
previous system, the district court had provided the assignment of cases and
the management of business. 40  Now, however, bankruptcy judges are free
to handle those important duties by themselves.
The Reform Act also gives bankruptcy judges greater autonomy through
an increase of their tenure. Previously, bankruptcy judges held six year terms
and could be removed by district court action. 4 ' Under the Reform Act,
judges will be appointed for a fourteen year term and their removal must be
by a majority of the circuit judicial council for reasons of "incompetency,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability." 42 The legisla-
tive history of the Reform Act indicates that Congress felt the change in
tenure was necessary to attract more qualified judges to the bankruptcy
bench.4 3 The tenure extension also was expected to protect the position
from political pressures and strengthen the credibility of bankruptcy judges'
decisions. 44  Although the House of Representatives and the Senate differed
as to the specific length of term to be adopted,4 5 the Reform Act represents
39. Id. § 156.
40. SUp. CT. R. BANKR. P. 102(a). The rules provide for an automatic referral of a bank-
ruptcy case to the bankruptcy judge by the clerk of the district court. Thus, the assignment is
technically left to the clerk's office. The district court, however, retains the right to withdraw
any case and hear it or assign it to another bankruptcy judge. Id. at R. 102(b). Assignment is
usually accomplished by a local rule designating the chief judge of the district court as assign-
ment supervisor. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. BANKR. R. 2.05-2.06.
41. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 555 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 34, 52 Stat. 857 (1938) and Act of June 28; 1946, ch. 512, § 34, 60 Stat. 324
(formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
43. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 17; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
44. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
45. This difference was based on whether the bankruptcy court should be an article III or
an article I court. Article III courts derive their authority from § 1 of article III of the Constitu-
tion, which provides: "[T]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good be-
haviour ....
On the other hand, article I courts-so-called legislative courts-are established because
Congress, in the exercise of its powers under article I, gives the authority to a court to hear
cases and controversies involving those over whom Congress' power may be asserted. See, e.g.,
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (District of Columbia criminal courts); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (judicial procedures of an administrative agency); Ex parte Bakelite,
279 U.S. 438 (1929) (customs court); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)
(territorial courts). It has been stated that while article III courts are established when laws of
national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, article I courts exist when
Congress is legislating "with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and war-
ranting distinctive treatment." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973).
The House saw the new bankruptcy laws as "laws of national applicability" requiring article
III courts to administer them. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32, quoting Palmore v. United
1012
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congressional agreement that a tenurial increase was necessary to secure and
protect judicial independence.4 6
In summary, the Reform Act establishes and secures the independent
functioning of the bankruptcy courts. Provisions for both procedural and
States, 411 U.S. at 408. In addition, the House concluded that article I legislative courts were
precluded by the broad jurisdiction and powers being invested in the new bankruptcy courts.
Id. at 29-30.
The Senate's view of the type of court required was contrary to that of the House. To the
Senate, bankruptcy was a specialized area "having particularized needs and warranting distinc-
tive treatment." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. at 408. Under this view, the new bank-
ruptcy courts would be article I legislative courts created under Congress' power to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. As to the House's conclusion that the new courts
would exercise too much jurisdiction and power to pass the test of an article I court, the Senate
felt the problem could be eliminated by limiting certain powers of the bankruptcy courts. SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-16. These limitations included establishing the new bank-
ruptcy courts as adjuncts of the district court, reposing all bankruptcy jurisdiction initially in the
district courts and then delegating all bankruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts, and
limiting the bankruptcy courts' injunctive power against state courts. Id.
In the Senate's view, article III guarantees, including life-tenure, were not essential. The
Senate recognized the need for an independent bankruptcy court, but felt that a twelve-year
term would suffice. Id. at 15-17. At this point, the House yielded the necessity of an article III
court, and, in exchange for a term of fourteen rather than twelve years, permitted the use of an
article- I legislative court.
Despite the Senate's assertion to the contrary and the House's acquiescence to the Senate
view, the constitutionality of the article I courts is questionable. The new bankruptcy courts will
exercise jurisdiction far exceeding that of their predecessor bankruptcy courts. Because bank-
ruptcy laws are laws of "national applicability," and because they will be uniformly administered
in each and every state, lack of article III guarantees may be fatal. Plumb, The Tax Recommen-
dations of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1360,
1468 (1975). Should the Supreme Court be faced with these issues, the validity of those provi-
sions of the Reform Act establishing the bankruptcy courts may be in jeopardy.
46. The Reform Act also provides for the appointment of bankruptcy judges by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate and with "due consideration" to the recommen-
dations of the circuit judicial council. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. II 1978). This marks a radical
change because under the old Act the bankruptcy judges had been appointed by the district
judges sitting within the same federal district. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat.
555 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 34, 52 Stat. 857 (1938) and Act of June
28, 1946, ch. 512, § 34, 60 Stat. 324 (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 62a (1976)) (repealed
1979). This practice had been highly criticized because it increased the dependency of the
bankruptcy court on the district court and decreased the image of bankruptcy judges. See SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16. See also The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 2266
and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., part I, 832 (1975) (statement of Charles A.
Horsky, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference). Presidential appointment was provided to
remove the impropriety of appointment by the district courts and to increase the prestige of the
new courts. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
The Reform Act also sets the annual salaries of bankruptcy judges at a figure only slightly less
than that received by district court judges. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 358 (Supp. 11 1978) (district
court judges receive $54,000 annual compensation) with 28 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. II 1978) (bank-
ruptcy court judges receive $50,000 annual compensation). Again, this provision is one which
reflects the general elevation in prestige which the Reform Act accords the bankruptcy
judiciary.
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substantive increases in judicial power ensure the ability of bankruptcy
judges to achieve independent status.
EXPANDED JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act was described in such mystical
terms as "summary," 4 7 "concurrent," 4 8 or "exclusive," 49 and was conceptu-
ally rooted in traditional notions of in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
Thus, in order for the bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction in any particular
case, the asset or party involved was required to have some connection with
the bankruptcy forum. In general, jurisdiction was extended to cover the
following: 50 (1) administrative matters; (2) disputes over property in "cus-
tody" of the court, i.e., in the possession of a bankrupt or in the name of a
reorganization debtor; (3) disputes arising during the course of administration
when adverse parties either had waived objections or consented to the
court's jurisdiction; (4) proceedings in which jurisdiction was statutorily con-
ferred; and (5) examinations of transactions between attorney and bankrupt
in order to avoid unreasonable charges or payments. If litigation could not
be categorized as one of the above, it was necessary to bring such action in
either a state or federal non-bankruptcy court. 51
The problems with bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the previous sys-
tem became obvious to even the most objective observer. First, frequent
and wasteful litigation addressing the sufficiency of the court's jurisdiction
caused great delay and expense. 52 Under a system in which cost and time
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 564 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler Act,
ch. 575, § 67(a)(4), 52 Stat. 876 (1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 107a(4) (1976) (repealed
1979).
48. Id. §§ 67(e), 7 0(e) 30 Stat. at 564, 566, 52 Stat. at 878, 882 (11 U.S.C. §§ 107(e), 110(e)).
49. Id. §§ 111, 311, 411, 611, as added by Chandler Act, §§ 111, 311, 411, 611, 52 Stat. at
884, 906, 917, 931 (11 U.S.C §§ 511, 711, 811, 1011). See generally Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939), in which the Supreme Court held that:
Among the [bankruptcy court's] granted powers are the allowance and disallowance
of claims; the collection and distribution of the estates of bankrupts and the deter-
mination of controversies in relation thereto; the rejection in whole or in part "ac-
cording to the equities of the case" of claims previously allowed and the entering of
such judgments "as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions" of the
Act. In such respects the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exclusive of all other
courts.
Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
50. These areas of jurisdiction were delineated by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
established by Congress in 1970. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 88-89.
51. Even in those cases in which the courts of bankruptcy were given "concurrent" jurisdic-
tion with local courts, see note 48 supra, uniform construction had prohibited the trustee from
bringing actions in bankruptcy court unless some other jurisdictional basis existed. 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPrcY 23.15, at 605, 622-23 (14th ed. 1976).
52. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, part I, at 88-92. See Note, Scope of Summary
Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 490 n.2 (1940), in which it is
noted that the issue of whether the court had summary jurisdiction had been litigated in every
volume of the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement from 1898 to 1940.
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factors represent basic considerations, the anomaly of litigation over jurisdic-
tion became completely antithetical to the goal of bankruptcy- speedy and
efficient resolution of financial crisis. 5 3
Second, the credibility of the bankruptcy court was greatly undermined by
certain practices which had developed under the jurisdictional requirements
of the old system. For example, there existed a practice known in bank-
ruptcy circles as "jurisdiction by ambush." 5 4  This occurred when the
debtor, bankrupt, or trustee notified a creditor that an action would be taken
on a particular date in a bankruptcy court. Because the creditor often lacked
familiarity with federal bankruptcy law, he or she usually would appear, al-
though not required to do so, and fail to object to jurisdiction. Under the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, such failure to object constituted consent to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 55
Given the jurisdictional problems under the Bankruptcy Act, the House
and Senate agreed on the necessity of expansive jurisdiction for the bank-
ruptcy courts. 56  Indeed, Congress intended the Reform Act to invest the
bankruptcy courts with "broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters
... that arise in connection with bankruptcy cases." 57  Specifically, section
1471 of title 28 of the United States Code now will give the bankruptcy
court original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under the Reform
Act. 58 This is the basic grant of jurisdiction equipping the bankruptcy
courts with the jurisdictional power necessary to handle the essential aspects
of bankruptcy cases. 59  Furthermore, title 28 was amended to give bank-
ruptcy courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings
arising under the Reform Act or arising in, or related to, cases under the
53. Gross & Hantzis, Making Bankruptcy Work for Consumers, 12 N. ENG. L. REv. 1, 13
(1976).
54. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
55. SUP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 915(a). The bankruptcy court's credibility was also diminished by
the former system's arbitrary jurisdictional limitations. See, e.g., In re Kirchoff Frozen Foods,
Inc., 375 F. Supp. 156 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 496 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 1974) (property in the
hands of officers of a bankrupt corporation could not be summarily disposed of in the bank-
ruptcy court even though creditors had alleged the property was obtained by fraudulent con-
veyances).
56. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 48; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.
Prior to the adoption of the Reform Act, piecemeal efforts were made to alleviate the jurisdic-
tional problems. For example, in ,1970, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to allow a bank-
rupt to vindicate a discharge in the bankruptcy court rather than be required to defend suits by
discharged creditors in state courts. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 5-3, 84 Stat.
992 (1970-71), amending 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(12), (35) (1970) (repealed 1979).
57. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 48.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (Supp. II 1978).
59. The House stated that this grant of jurisdiction is "the broadest grant of jurisdiction to
dispose of proceedings that arise under the bankruptcy code. The idea of possession or consent
as the sole basis for jurisdiction is eliminated. The bankruptcy court is given in personam juris-
diction as well as in rem jurisdiction to handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy case."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 445.
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Reform Act. 60 The well-defined phrase "arising under" was borrowed from
other jurisdictional contexts and was intended to "leave no doubt as to the
scope of the bankruptcy court jurisdiction." 61 Thus, bankruptcy court juris-
diction now includes bankruptcy litigation in its entirety- adversary pro-
ceedings, plenary actions, determination of reaffirmation validity, and claims
of exemption and/or discrimination. 62
In conjunction with providing expanded jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts,
the Reform Act establishes procedural changes enabling the parties to exer-
cise more control over forum selection. Under the Reform Act, a party may
remove any civil action to the bankruptcy court of the district wherein the
action is pending if that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction.63 In addition,
the bankruptcy court may remand a case back to the original court "on any
equitable ground." 64  These provisions enable bankruptcy removal to serve
the same purpose that the normal removal statute serves in other federal
courts by giving a "defendant who has been sued in a state court of compe-
tent jurisdiction the right to substitute a forum of his or her own choosing
for that originally selected by the plaintiff .... 65 Unlike the normal re-
moval statute, 66 bankruptcy removal rights will not be limited to defendants.
Plaintiffs who are also debtors in bankruptcy proceedings or trustees-in-
bankruptcy may choose to transfer actions to bankruptcy court from the state
or federal court in which their suit is filed. 67
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. II 1978).
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 445.
62. Id. at 445-46. Although Congress intended to bring all matters relating to a bankruptcy
case into the bankruptcy forum, it was recognized that there is an occasional need for abstention
by the bankruptcy court. Id. at 446; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 54. For example, in
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum, 309 U.S. 478 (1940), the Supreme Court directed a trustee
to proceed in state court for determination of an unsettled question of state property law. Id. at
483-84. The Court explained:
A court of bankruptcy has an exclusive and non-delegable control over the adminis-
tration of an estate in its possession. But the proper exercise of that control may,
where the interests of the estate and the parties will best be served, lead the bank-
ruptcy court to consent to submission to state courts of particular controversies in-
volving unsettled questions of state property law and arising in the course of bank-
ruptcy administration.
Id. at 483. Section 1471(d) of title 28 is consistent with this logic. This section permits a bank-
ruptcy court to abstain "in the interest of justice," and provides that a decision to abstain or
proceed will not be reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp. II 1978). See 11 U.S.C.
app. § 305 (Supp. 11 1978).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1478(a) (Supp. II 1978). The only exceptions to this provision involve those
actions brought before either the United States Tax Court or a governmental unit enforcing its
police or regulatory power. Id.
64. Id. § 1478(b). 28 U.S.C. app. § 1478(b) (Supp. 11 1978) states that such a removal or
remand is not appealable.
65. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JUR-
ISDICTION § 3721, at 514 (1976).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 11 1978).
67. Id. § 1478.
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Finally, it should be noted that while the Reform Act generously expands
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, there are certain jurisdictional pro-
visions, such as the provisions addressing the power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus,6 8 which remain as they appeared in the Bankruptcy Act. The venue
provision also remains unchanged. 69  In short, however, the Reform Act's
expansion of jurisdiction brings bankruptcy court proceedings in line with
the current insistence on procedural due process and the modern trend
toward relaxed jurisdiction.
SEPARATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTION
In addition to their judicial duties, bankruptcy judges under the Bank-
ruptcy Act were required to perform clerical tasks. 70  Reasons for this dual
68. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2256 (Supp. 11 1978) with Sup. CT. R. BANKS. P. 913. Under the
Reform Act, the bankruptcy court may have an imprisoned debtor produced for two purposes.
First, the prisoner may be ordered brought before the court for examination, testimony, or
performance of duties imposed under title 11. Second, the prisoner may be ordered released if
arrested or imprisoned through civil process issued for collection of a debt dischargeable under
title 11 or to be provided for in a chapter 11 or chapter 13 plan. 28 U.S.C. § 2256 (Supp. II
1978). Given the infrequency of imprisonment for debts today, these provisions are probably of
small value. See V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 81-86
(2d ed. 1974).
69. Compare Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 116 with 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. II 1978). For cases
strictly under the Bankruptcy Code, proper venue will be in the district of longest domicile,
residence, or principal place of business for the six months immediately preceding the filing of
the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. II 1978). In those cases in which the debtor has an affiliate,
general partner, or partnership already in a pending bankruptcy case, proper venue will lie in
the district of the pending case. Id.
However, the Reform Act's provisions for proceedings arising under or related to cases aris-
ing under title 11 are entirely new. Venue in such cases will be proper in the bankruptcy court
where the original case is pending. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1472-1475 (Supp. II 1978). There are, how-
ever, four exceptions to this rule. First, the trustee may only bring collection proceedings in-
volving less than one thousand dollars, or less than five thousand dollars in the case of consumer
debt, in the district of the defendant's residence. Id. § 1473(b). Second, when a trustee statuto-
rily succeeds to the debtor or the creditors under the provisions of title 11, the trustee may
bring a bankruptcy court action only in the district in which the debtor or the creditors could
have proceeded. Id. § 1473(c). Third, a trustee operating the business of the debtor after the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding may sue on a claim arising out of operation only in
the bankruptcy court for the district where the suit normally could have been brought. Id.
§ 1473(d). Finally, a suit against a debtor-in-possession or a trustee, arising out of operation of the
business after commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, may, at the complainant's option, be
brought in the bankruptcy court of the district where the case is pending or where the action
could have been brought if not for the bankruptcy. Id. § 1473(e).
70. The Commission Report lists matters of administration as:
1. determining all issues arising in connection with bankruptcy petitions;
2. selecting officers, attorneys, accountants, etc.;
3. conducting creditors' meetings and examinations;
4. determining exemptions and claims;
5. selling of the assets;
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1007
role were twofold. First, administrative duties historically had been
imposed on the bankruptcy judiciary. 71 The role of the bankruptcy judge
evolved from that of the referee, which had originated as the administrative
arm of the district court. 72  Referees, as fee officers of the district court,
handled the liquidation and distribution of estates and reported back to the
district court. 73 Gradually, however, the position of referee began to in-
clude more judicial duties. 74 Thus, prior to the passage of the Reform Act,
the overlap of judicial and administrative functions had been established.
The second factor contributing to the development of the dual role was
the administrative failure of the Bankruptcy Act. 75  Originally, administra-
tion of the Bankruptcy Act was intended to be creditor-controlled: creditors
elected a trustee and negotiated with the bankrupt while the referee or
judge was left to perform judicial functions. 76 However, because creditors
were often geographically scattered, ill-represented, and generally unwilling
to press their interests in bankruptcy when there was little or no chance for
recovery of costs, creditor control proved to be a myth. 77
6. distributing proceeds of estates;
7. granting or denying discharges and confirmation of plans;
8. allowing fees and expenses payable out of the estate.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 124. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976). See also HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 8.
Although a survey of bankruptcy judges indicated that they spent only twenty-two percent of
their time on administrative matters, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, part I, at 5, this still
represents a large diversion from judicial duties. The Commission discounted the low percentage
the survey revealed on the grounds of improper classification of duties. Id. But see Cyr, supra
note 7, at 122 (the Commission had no basis for its explanation).
71. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 8-9.
74. For example, the Chandler Act outlined specific duties of the referee-in-bankruptcy.
These included giving notice to creditors and other parties-in-interest; examining and causing to
be corrected any incomplete or defective schedules of property or lists of creditors; preserving
evidence taken for use on appeal; and preparing the record for review. Chandler Act, ch. 575,
§ 39a(1)-(3), (8), 52 Stat. 858 (1938) (repealed 1979).
Concurrent with this increase in judicial responsibilities, some of the referee's administrative
duties were transferred into the hands of the trustee and the clerk. Chandler Act, ch. 575,
§ 39a(9)-(10), 52 Stat. 858 (1938) (repealed 1979). In 1966, provisions were adopted prohibiting
referees from serving as trustees or receivers. Act of May 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-44, 80 Stat.
135. Finally, with the adoption of the 1973 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the judicial role of
the bankruptcy judge was emphasized and extended. See SUP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 506 (the
referee judge may delegate any ministerial function to an assistant employed in the court's office
or to any person employed in the office of the clerk of the district court); id. R. 507 (the clerk of
the district court is required to keep the bankruptcy docket book and an index of all the cases
filed, and is also required to present the referee (judge) with all paper pertinent to the case
before him or her).
75. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 88-92.
76. Id. at 89.
77. Creditors' notions that credit losses are merely a cost of doing business have made
creditor interest the exception rather than the rule in modern bankruptcy practice (based on the
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Therefore, given both the historic imposition of administrative duties upon
the judiciary and the failure of other sources to provide the supervision es-
sential to the proper functioning of bankruptcy procedures, the bankruptcy
court was forced to fill the void. 78 Consequently, the bankruptcy judiciary
became hopelessly enmeshed in supervisory functions.
The bankruptcy court's problems with its dual role were vividly apparent.
Primarily, the performance of administrative functions diverted judicial at-
tention from judicial matters. 79  Additionally, an appearance of impropriety
was created by the close working relationship that developed between
judges and trustees.8 0 Finally, the dual role created the opportunity for
biased litigation. 8 Indeed, the bankruptcy court's role as factfinder and
adjudicator was threatened by the judge's mandatory attendance at informal
hearings likely to expose him or her to highly prejudicial evidence not ad-
missible later at more formal proceedings. 8 2 Maintaining a neutral judicial
perspective in such a situation was difficult.
The congressional solution to these problems was to give as many clerical
and supervisory functions as possible to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court,
to the United States Trustee, and to the panel of private trustees.8 3 In-
deed, the intent is to give the bankruptcy court a more "passive role" with
respect to administrative duties.8 4 The expectation is that the problems re-
sulting from the combination of judicial and administrative roles will be
eliminated. 85
The primary method of separating judicial and administrative functions
under the Reform Act is to expand the role of the United States Trustees to
that of the "principal administrative officers of the bankruptcy system.'86
This provision is pursuant to a "pilot program" 87 that "self-destructs" in 1984
if not congressionally renewed. 8 This program is intended to remove
authors' personal experience and conversations with attorneys in creditor and collection prac-
tice).
78. See, e.g., Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 209(b)(1) (bankruptcy judge shall appoint a trustee if
the creditors do not elect a trustee).
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 89.
80. Id. at 89-90. One area particularly vulnerable to suspicion was the awarding of attorneys'
and trustees' fees to persons regularly appearing before the court. Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 90-91.
82. A variation of this occurred in reorganization proceedings in which the court was forced
to actually become involved in the merits of debtor-in-possession financing, negotiations, or
asset sales. Id. at 91.




87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589 (Supp. II 1978).
88. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 408(c), 92 Stat. 2687. A
study of the program up to that point will be undertaken and Congress will then either act to
renew the program or allow it to lapse, depending on the results of the trial period. id. Like
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supervisory responsibility from the judges while still providing a non-
centralized bankruptcy administration. It is not intended, however, to re-
place the existing private trustee system 8 9 and will exist in only certain
selected judicial districts. 90
An examination of the Reform Act indicates that many supervisory duties
previously relegated to bankruptcy judges are now assumed by the United
States Trustees. One significant change is that the general supervision of
cases covered by chapters 7, 11, and 13 is now placed primarily in the hands
of the United States Trustee. 91 This relieves the judiciary of a number of
administrative duties and enables it to focus upon those issues appropriate to
its office. Also, final reports, accounts, and fee applications of standing and
private trustees will be filed with both the bankruptcy court and the United
States Trustee. 92 Therefore, although the court continues to rule on fees,
the burden of discovering administrative incongruities and unreasonable fees
has been removed from the court's shoulders. Furthermore, monies received
from the administration of an estate by a private trustee or the United States
Trustee will be safely invested by the United States Trustee during the pen-
dency of a proceeding. 93  Formerly, such an investment required a court
order and court supervision. 94 Finally, under chapter 11, the United States
Trustee may appoint a committee of unsecured creditors. 95  If a party in
interest requests the court to appoint additional creditors' committees, and
the administration of the United States Attorney program, supervision of the trustees is to be
provided by the United States Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (Supp. 11 1978). Trustees will
be appointed by the Attorney General for a seven year term. Id. § 581. The Attorney General
retains the right to remove for cause and the right to fix salaries at not more than $44,676. Id.
§§ 581, 587. See also 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (Schedule 1) (West Supp. 1979). Also, provisions have
been made for the appointment of assistant trustees and other staff as well as for the reim-
bursement of necessary expenses. 28 U.S.C. §§ 582, 588-589 (Supp. II 1978).
89. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 101.
90. For non-pilot districts, a panel of private trustees will be established and supervised by
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 604(f) (Supp.
II 1978). The pilot districts are the: Districts of Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, and South Dakota; Central District of California; Eastern District of Virginia; Northern
Districts of Alabama, Illinois, and Texas; Southern District of New York. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1501
(Supp. II 1978).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (Supp. II 1978).
92. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 330(a) (fee applications), 15103(f) (modifying § 704(8)), 15704 (final
reports and accounts) (Supp. 11 1978).
93. Id. § 15345(b). The private trustee now may also make safe investments to gain a
maximum yield for the estate. Id. § 345(a).
94. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 61, 30 Stat. 562 (1897-99), as amended by
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 61, 52 Stat. 872 (1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1976))
(repealed 1979) (limiting investment of the estate's monies to approved banking institutions).




the court concludes that the appointment is necessary to "assure adequate
representation," the United States Trustee will appoint such committees. 96
Other administrative duties have been transferred from the bankruptcy
court without specific imposition on the United States Trustees. One of the
most drastic of these changes is that the bankruptcy judge is no longer per-
mitted to preside at the first meeting of creditors. 97  Private or standing
trustees and the United States Trustee, however, may attend the meeting
and examine the debtor. 98
Finally, in addition to transferring certain administrative duties away from
the judges, the Reform Act also eliminates some administrative steps. Under
a "notice-and-hearing" 99 concept of administration, certain judicial adminis-
trative duties normally involving unopposed decisions are eliminated. 100 This
procedure is justified by the logic that some matters have become so routine
that the bankruptcy judge need not be concerned with them. 1 1 For exam-
ple, when requests for administrative expenses are presented, notice and a
hearing will be provided to interested creditors if any creditors appear to
contest the allowance. 10 2 If no such objection occurs, administrative ex-
penses are allowed as requested. 10 3
The Reform Act has gone even further. Certain administrative duties have
been eliminated without providing for "notice and a hearing" to interested
creditors. Under these provisions, trustees may now use, sell, and lease
property of the estate in the ordinary course of business, without either
notice or a hearing, if they have been authorized to operate the debtor's
business by the court under chapters 7, 11, or 13.104 This marks a signifi-
96. 11 U.S.C. app. § 151102(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
Supp. 1979).
97. Id. § 341(c). But see S. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(b) (1979), which would require
the bankruptcy court to preside at any election of the trustee. Under the new procedure, the
court must call a meeting of the creditors not less than 20 nor more than 40 days after the order
for relief. The clerk of the court is to preside unless a trustee is elected by the creditors. If a
trustee is elected, the creditors vote on the amount of the trustee's bond. In addition, an
electronic recording will be made of the proceedings. The court is insulated from this meeting
because the clerk of the court may not disclose the proceedings to the court. This rule applies
in all chapter 7 cases where a trustee is elected. In that case, the court only will be informed of
the trustee's name and address. INTERIM RULES, supra note 9, Rule 2003.
98. Id. §§ 343, 15343.
99. The "notice-and-hearing" concept is explained at 11 U.S.C. app. § 102(1) (Supp. II
1978).
100. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 108.
101. See Sup. CT. R. BANKsI. P. 506. See also 28 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. II 1978).
102. 11 U.S.C. app. § 503(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
103. Correlative with the concept of "notice and a hearing," proof of claims continue to be
allowed when filed unless objected to by a party-in-interest. 11 U.S.C. app. § 502(a) (Supp. II
1978). If an objection is registered, the bankruptcy court is required to determine the proper
amount of such a claim. Id. § 502(b). Such a determination, however, generally will require a
judicial hearing rather than an administrative approval.
104. Id. § 363(c). The trustee may enter into transactions outside the ordinary course of
business, but only after notice and a hearing on any objectives. Id. § 363(b).
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cant departure from previous law, which had provided that continuation of
the business always required court approval.105
Despite Congress' ambitious attempts with the Reform Act, many of the
bankruptcy court's duties will continue to be "administrative" in nature. In-
deed, in those jurisdictions where United States Trustees will not be ap-
pointed, the bankruptcy judge's supervisory role often will remain as ad-
ministrative as it has always been. Even in those jurisdictions in which a
United States Trustee will be appointed, the court will retain many of its
administrative duties. One area in which the court maintains administrative
duties is fees. For example, the court will continue to control compensation
of United States Trustees in chapters 7 and 11 cases, and in chapter 13 cases
when a private trustee is elected.' 0 6 In addition, the court will be required
to approve the employment and compensation of attorneys and other profes-
sionals whose services are necessary for the administration of the estate. 1
07
Finally, the court will continue to examine a debtor's transactions with his
attorney and to cancel any fees which the court finds excessive.' 0 8
A second area of continued judicial administration involves the securing of
credit by trustees or debtors-in-possession. Although the new provisions for
obtaining credit are much broader than those under the Bankruptcy Act, the
bankruptcy court still is required to supervise such transactions.' 0 9
Moreover, assumption and rejection of executory leases or unexpired leases
require judicial supervision of the trustee's decision. 110 The only exception
in this area is for unsecured credit in the ordinary course of business when
the trustee or debtor is already operating the business under court ap-
proval."'
105. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2(5), 30 Stat. 546 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 2(5) 52 Stat. 843 (1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(5) (1976)) (re-
pealed 1979); SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 216. This was true even in chapter X reorganization and
chapter XI arrangements where continuation of busines was the norm. Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, § 189 343 (1897-99) as added by Chandler Act, ch. 575 § 189, 343 52 Stat. 892, 909
(1938) (formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 589, 743 (1976)) (repealed 1979); SuP. CT. R. BANKR.
P. 10-20, 11-23.
106. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 326, 15326 (Supp. II 1978). But see S. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 195 (1979) which would disallow any payment to a standing trustee or a United States trustee
under a chapter 13 proceeding.
107. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 327, 330 (Supp. II 1978).
108. Id. § 329(b). Congress clearly has indicated that an attorney or professional is entitled to
a normal fee for bankruptcy services, rather than a bargain fee "based on notions of conservation
of the estate and judicial economy," as was previously the case. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7,
at 329-30. The relaxation of the standard may result in the bankruptcy court not being as
vigilant in examining professional and attorney compensation.
109. 11 U.S.C. app. § 364 (Supp. I 1978). C.f. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 116(2),
344, 446, as added by Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 116(2), 344, 446, 52 Stat. 885, 909, 920 (1938)
(formerly codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(2) (chapter X), 744 (chapter XI) 846 (chapter XII) (1976))
(repealed 1979) authorizing the receiver, trustee, or debtor-in-possession to issue certificates of
indebtedness upon court order.
110. 11 U.S.C. app. § 365 (Supp. 11 1978).
111. Id. § 364(a).
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Finally, the administrative duty of closing and reopening cases remains
almost exactly as it was under the Bankruptcy Act. 1 12  The court continues
to "close the case" after it has been "fully administered" and to reopen the
case "to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other
cause." 113
In addition to performing many administrative duties for which it had
been responsible under the Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court under the
Reform Act is required to perform at least one entirely new administrative
function. The Reform Act requires that the court administer the holding of a
discharge hearing. 114 At such a hearing, the court must inform the debtor
whether a discharge has been granted. If a discharge has been granted, the
court must then examine any reaffirmation agreements entered into by the
debtor. 115 Subsequently, the task of policing reaffirmations also falls to the
judiciary. 1 6 This task includes: (1) instructing the debtor that reaffirmation
is not required under either bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy law; 117 (2) in-
forming the debtor of the legal effects and consequences of reaffirmation; (3)
clarifying the thirty day recission period provided by the Reform Act; 118 and
(4) determining the validity of a reaffirmation under the strict limitations
imposed by the Reform Act." l9
112. Compare Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 514, 515 with 11 U.S.C. app § 350 (Supp. II 1978).
113. I U.S.C. app. § 350 (Supp. 11 1978).
114. Id. § 524(d).
115. Id. § 524(c)-(d). Reaffirmation is a promise, binding under state contract law, in which a
debtor manifests an intent to become totally or partially liable for a debt dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. See W. LAUBE, W. HILL & L. KING, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 17.12, at
219.13-. 14 (2d ed., 1976). In consideration for a debtor's reaffirmation, the creditor agrees to
return assets seized before bankruptcy or demanded during bankruptcy either pursuant to a
security agreement or lien or to supply cash. Reaffirmations generally are made only by indi-
vidual debtors. Businesses or corporations undergoing straight bankruptcy are dissolved or
abandoned after liquidation and therefore usually have little reason to reaffirm.
116. 11 U.S.C. app. § 524(c)-(d) (Supp. 11 1978). Congress felt such supervision necessary
based on its conclusion that consumer debtors are often coerced into reaffirming through high-
pressure creditor tactics. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 162-64; SENATE REPORT, supra note
7, at 80.
117. 11 U.S.C. app. § 524(d)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
118. Id. § 524(d)(1)(B).
119. Id. § 524(d)(2). Because immediate entry of discharge may inhibit a debtor's right to
enter into reaffirmation agreements (as where the same date is fixed for filing objections to a
discharge and dischargeability complaints), the court, upon application of the debtor, shall grant
a delay of 45 days of the order granting discharge and may, at its discretion, grant further
delays. INTERiM RULES, supra note 9, Rule 4002. Reaffirmation validity requires that the agree-
ment be made before a discharge is granted. This requirement allows the court sufficient time
to examine the agreement and to estimate its effects, 11 U.S.C. app. § 524(c)(1) (Supp. II
1978). The court may then approve the agreement if it is satisfied that the agreement does not
impose an "undue hardship on the debtor" and "in the best interest of the debtor." Id.
§ 524(c)(4)?A). If an agreement is in settlement of litigation over a debtor's discharge, the court
may approve the reaffirmation if settlement was "entered into in good faith." Id. § 524(c)(4)(B).
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To summarize, while the Reform Act makes significant changes which
serve to separate the administrative and judicial functions of the bankruptcy
court, it does not provide total delineation. Indeed, while the court is re-
leased from some administrative duties, entirely new supervisory duties are
also placed upon it. In retrospect, all streamlining of the new court's ad-
ministrative duties was done primarily in areas involving matters of general
administrative efficiency and creditor-control. Some of the additional ad-
ministrative duties imposed by the Reform Act were created to benefit con-
sumer debtors. 120  Congress' action here was quite competent, given the
serious problem of protecting consumer debtors from the potentially oppres-
sive effects of reaffirmation agreements.
CONCLUSION
The Reform Act represents a significant congressional attempt to invigo-
rate federal bankruptcy law. Although it may fail to accomplish all that it set
out to achieve, 12 1 the Reform Act undoubtedly will succeed in establishing
an elevated and more independent bankruptcy judiciary. This accomplish-
ment will enable the court to deal with the commercial realities of a con-
temporary society in a manner beneficial to those who rely upon the court to
resolve financial conflicts expeditiously. Therefore, the Reform Act can only
be viewed as "coming of age" in the twentieth century. Insofar as "coming of
age" usually necessitates the growing pains of maturation, the Reform Act
may be expected to fall short of resolving all the problems existent within
the bankruptcy system. Insofar as "coming of age" represents a new begin-
ning, however, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 signifies a positive
change.
Because creditors often sue without actual grounds for a denial of discharge and because debtors
often settle merely to avoid the aggravation that accompanies litigation, the court's function is to
deter reaffirmation settlements based on groundless suits. See id. § 523(d) (litigation costs
charged to creditor where dischargeability determination occurs at creditor's request and dis-
charge is granted).
120. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text supra.
121. It may be that the bankruptcy judge will now be deluged with more formal matters. For
example, the bankruptcy judge may now be required to deal with a variety of contested litiga-
tional matters from creditors and debtors seeking a hearing or "review" of trustee determina-
tions. See, e.g., INTERM RULES, supra note 9, R. 2003(d). Such disputes would never arise if a
judicial officer originally presided.
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